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The New Federal Rules and
Louisiana Practice
IRA S. FLORY* AND HENRY G. MCMAHONt
September 16th, 1938, may well be written in red figures on
the calendar of American legal history, for on this date the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. It marked the
successful termination of a thirty year fight for a system of pro-
cedure in actions at law common to all of the federal district
courts and the courts of the District of Columbia. For the first
time in their history these federal courts were governed by a
single procedural system, applicable both to cases in equity and
actions at law. However great these advantages may prove to
be, they by no means constitute the sole benefits of the adoption
of the new Federal Rules. The legal profession in America will
profit from this event in at least two other important aspects.
First, in litigation conducted in the federal courts the practitioner
will reap the fruits of the most advanced and enlightened system
of procedure which American genius has yet devised. Second, the
opportunity for comparative study resulting from the necessity of
possessing a working knowledge of the new federal procedure as
well as the local state practice is certain to lead to improvement
of the latter through borrowings from the former. September
16th marked the beginning of a great movement towards uni-
formity of procedure in America.
In all probability, Louisiana practitioners will have less diffi-
culty in adjusting themselves to the new federal procedure than
the lawyers of many other states. The Federal Equity Rules of
1913, springing from much the same Romano-canonical base as
did our own practice, have had so great an influence on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the differences between
Louisiana practice and the new federal procedure are not so
great as would be imagined. However, it must not be assumed
that even a mastery of Louisiana procedure will be the equivalent
of a working knowledge of the new federal practice. Much of
the substance of the Rules, dealing'only with aspects of federal
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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procedure and making important changes in this field, can be
understood only in the light of prior federal practice. In addition,
a few of the procedural advances embodied in the Federal Rules
bear not the slightest resemblance to any of the concepts and
principles of the adjective law of Louisiana.
When the Code of Practice of 1825 was redacted, the Living-
ston Committee presented Louisiana with a system of procedure
far in advance of that of any other American state. Within the
past century, however, other jurisdictions of the United States
have made great strides in the improvement of the system of ad-
jective law by adopting procedural codes incorporating many of
the best features of the Code of Practice.1 But this process of im-
proving procedure did not stop there; in certain of the states it
has been a continuous one, resulting in the gradual evolution of
new procedural devices, the best of which have been incorporated
into the new Federal Rules. The experience in Louisiana during
the past hundred years has not been a similar one. Too little
attention was paid to adjective law, and while numerous statutes
have been adopted affecting the procedural law of this state, a
few have been hastily drafted, ill-considered, and productive
only of confusion and uncertainty. Ignoring the original symme-
try of our Code of Practice, some of these statutes have run afoul
of code provisions not intended to be affected.2 At least one of
these misdirected efforts, representing nothing but a phase in the
evolution of the procedure of other states towards an ultimate
which Louisiana then enjoyed, robbed Louisiana pleading of
much of its efficacy and simplicity. The result is that, in certain
phases of procedural development, Louisiana practice has lagged
1. See Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading (1897) 78 et
seq.; Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law
(1896) 19 A. B. A. Rep. 411, 427; Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading
(1928) 22, n. 70.
2. E. g., La. Act 53 of 1839, § 23 was passed to overturn the doctrine of
Magee v. Dunbar, 10 La. 546 (1837) which held that a dilatory exception might
be filed after the taking of a default. In the revision of 1870 this statutory
provision was tacked on to Art. 333, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The result
was to override Art. 336, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Chaffe v. Ludeling, 34
La. Ann. 962 (1882). From this sprang the highly objectionable practice of
"stringing out" the exceptions-a result which the Legislature never dreamed
of. To suppress this practice Art. 333, La..Code of Practice of 1870 was
amended and re-enacted by La. Act 124 of 1936. The last amendment in turn
has produced complications which the Legislature did not foresee. See
Comment, infra, p. 174.
3. Arts. 170-172, 319, 323-325, La. Code of Practice of 1825 and 1870 conse-
crated a simple method of pleading not unlike that of the Federal Rules. The
Pleading and Practice Act superimposed on this base the fact pzeading of
American code procedure. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 as last amended by La.
Act 27 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483].
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far behind the new federal procedure. If we enjoy a workable
system of procedure in Louisiana today it is 'largely in spite of,
rather than because of, efforts at improvement since 1825. A few
of the concepts and principles of the Federal Rules will prove
novel to the majority of Louisiana practitioners.
Once before, an era of improvement of adjective law was
ushered in when, in 1848, New York adopted the David Dudley
Field Code of Procedure. Two factors were responsible for the
judicial antagonism which braked the momentum of this earlier
movement. The first was the traditional antipathy of common
law courts towards legislation. The second was that the Field
Commission, fearful of arbitrary judicial action, attempted the
wholly visionary scheme of drafting a code so complete that
nothing would be left to judicial discretion. The Federal Rules
have profited by the unfortunate experience of the Field Code
of Procedure. The enabling statute empowered the Supreme
Court itself "to prescribe, by general rules, . .. the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law," and further provided that the
court might "at any time unite the general rules prescribed
by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to
secure one form of civil action and procedure for both."'4 The
committee appointed by the Supreme Court to draft these Rules
obviated the other difficulty by confining these Rules, as far as
practicable, to the statement of procedural principles, leaving
the treatment of particular cases to the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. Not only is the new federal procedure the handiwork
of the judiciary, but the responsibility for its effective operation
is placed squarely upon the shoulders of the courts. The basic
philosophy of the new system is voiced by a canon of construc-
tion in the initial Rule, providing that the new Federal Rules
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." This, it must be remembered, is
a judicial commitment and not an expression of legislative coer-
cion. There is little reason to fear that judicial antagonism will
throttle the new movement towards improvement of the adjective
law.
Probably the most outstanding feature of the new Rules is
that, insofar as practice is concerned, they sweep away all dis-
tinctions between suits in equity and actions at law. The Rules
go as far as constitutionally possible in levelling the two.5 While
4. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (b, c) (1937).
5. Rule 2. "There shall be one form of action known as 'civil action.'"
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suits in equity are not triable ordinarily before a jury, it must be
remembered that the Seventh Amendment saved to all suitors at
law in the federal courts the right to a trial by jury. The enab-
ling act therefore contained the proviso that "in such union of
rules the right of trial by jury as at common law . . .shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate.' 6 This constitutional right
has been reserved by the Rules.7
Limitations of space require the omission from this paper of
a number of the new Federal Rules8 which could not be included
in this comparative treatment. As far as practicable, the others
will be discussed under the nine following topics in the order in
which they are presented in the new Federal Rules.
PRocEss-The form prescribed for the summons is almost
identical with that required of the citation.9 Similarly to Louisi-
ana practice, the summons is issued by the clerk and ordinarily
delivered to and served by the marshal.10 Service of the complaint
is substantially identical with service of the petition under
6. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (c) (1937).
7. Rule 38 (a).
8. Omitted from the scope of this article are the following:
Rule 53, relating to the appointment of Masters, their powers and com-
pensation, and proceedings had before them.
Rule 66, concerning administration of estates by receivers or similar
officers.
Rule 71, relating to serving of orders on persons not parties to the liti-
gation.
Rule 77, concerning district courts and the clerks thereof.
Rule 78, requiring the designation of Motion Days by district courts.
Rule 79, requiring clerks of the district courts to keep certain books and
records.
Rule 80, providing for the appointment, and regulating the duties, of
district court stenographers.
Rule 81, regulating the general applicability of the Rules. See also Rule 1.
Rule 82: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the juris-
diction of the district courts of the United States or the venue of actions
therein."
Rule 83, authorizing district courts to make rules not inconsistent with
the new Federal Rules.
Rule 84, referring to the Appendix of Forms to indicate the simplicity
and brevity of pleadings under the Rules.
Rule 85: "These rules may be known and cited as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."
Rule 86, concerning the effective date of the Rules. It further provides
that the Rules "govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take
effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work in-
justice, in which event the former procedure applies."
9. Rule 4 (b). Cf. Art. 179, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
10. Rule 4 (c). Cf. Art. 186, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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Louisiana practice;1 however, under the new federal practice
the court is authorized to make "special appointment to serve
process ... when substantial savings in travel fees will result."12
As under our practice, service of process upon a competent in-
dividual may be either personal or domiciliary. 13 Jurisdiction is
exercised over incompetents "by serving the summons and com-
plaint in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which
the service is made.. ."14 The same similarity obtains with regard
to foreign or domestic corporations for whom process may be
served upon "an officer, a managing or general agent, or ... any
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process."15 Special provisions provide for service upon
the United States.1 6 Obviously, no similar provisions are neces-
sary under Louisiana practice. Under the Rules, process against
a state or municipal corporation thereof may be served either
upon the chief executive officer thereof, or in the manner pre-
scribed by state law.17  Apparently, the return of service is
identical with that required by Louisiana practice,"8 except that
special process servers must execute an affidavit of the service
and facts thereof.1 9 Greater liberality is afforded by the new
Rules which permit ready amendment both of "any process or
proof of service thereof. '20
Of more than passing interest is Rule 4 (f) which permits
11. Rule 4. Cf. Arts. 186-191, 194-195, 197, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La.
Act 179 of 1918, § 1, as amended by La. Act 48 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §
1933].
12. Rule 4 (c).
13. Rule 4 (dl). Cf. Arts. 187-190, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Act
179 of 1918, § 1 (2, 9) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1933 (2, 9)].
14. Rule 4 (d2). This section makes the following provisions of Louisi-
ana law applicable for service of process on incompetents: Arts. 194-195, La.
Code of Practice of 1870; Art. 116, La. Code of Practice of 1870 as last
amended by La. Act 167 of 1924; La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1 (2) [Dart's Stats.
(1932) § 1933 (2) ].
15. Rule 4 (d3). For corresponding provisions of Louisiana law, see:
DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS-La. Act 250 of 1928, § 37 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §
1117].
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-La. Act 184 of 1924, §§ 1-3 [Dart's Stats. (1932)
88 1250-3]. See also, La. Act. 179 of 1918, § 1 (6a-e) [Dart's Stats. (1932)
§ 1933 (6a-e)].
DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANIES-La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 2 (3) [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 4001 (3)]. On this point, see Mouton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
177 So. 431 (La. App. 1937).
FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANIES-La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. II, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 4018].
16. Rule 4 (d4-5).
17. Rule 4 (d6).
18. Rule 4 (g). Cf. Art. 200, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Act 179 of
1918, § 1 (22) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1933 (22)].
19. Rule 4 (g).
20. Rule 4 (h).
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service of process (other than of a subpoena) anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state. Differently from the former
practice 21 it is now possible to institute suit in one federal dis-
trict and have process served on an agent of defendant in another
in the same state, provided the requirements of jurisdiction and
venue are satisfied.
2 2
In the service of notices, contradictory motions and all plead-
ings other than the original complaint, the new procedure is
markedly superior to Louisiana practice. It requires that all
these pleadings be served upon the opposing party,23 and this
service may be made by simple delivery of a copy to the party
or his counsel.2 ' In comparison, few such proceedings need to be
served under Louisiana practice,25 and the only provision for their
service is the mere power to have all service after appearance
made by the sheriff or his deputy on the opposing counsel of
record.26
PLEADING-It is in this field that Louisiana practice suffers
most from a comparison with the Federal Rules. The chief charac-
teristics of this phase of the new adjective law are the simplicity
and brevity of the contemplated pleadings. The Louisiana prac-
titioner, accustomed to the minute and never-ending ramifications
of the fact pleadings in an automobile accident personal injury
suit, has both a treat and a shock awaiting him when he turns to
Forms 9 and 10 and reads the complaints suggested by the new
Rules27 for such a claim. The new procedure comes closer to notice
21. See Boykin v. Hope Production Co., 58 F. (2d) 1041 (D. C. La. 1931),
and authorities cited therein.
22. Cf. Boykin v. Hope Production Co., 58 F. (2d) 1041 (D. C. La. 1931).
23. Rule 5 (b).
24. Rule 5 (b). This delivery may be made by: handing a copy to the
party or his attorney; mailing it to either at his last known address; leaving
it at his office with a clerk or other person in charge, or if no one is in
charge, leaving it there in a conspicuous place; or if no office exists or it is
closed, leaving it at his usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age or discretion.
25. E. g., neither exceptions, answers nor reconventional demands need
be served on plaintiff, who is presumed to be in court and who must take
notice thereof. Cf. Hobson v. Woolfolk, 23 La. Ann. 384 (1871). Nothing is
more provoking than the necessity of going to court to write out long excep-
tions, answers and reconventional demands, copies of which a discourteous
opponent has refused to mail.
26. La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1 (16) [Dart's Stats. (1932) 1 1933 (16)]. This
provision was construed very strictly, and held not to apply to service of a
petition of intervention upon counsel of record. Adams v. Ross Amusement
Co., 182 La. 252, 161 So. 601 (1935). La. Act 120 of 1938, 1 1 has overruled this
case to the extent of allowing service of the intervention upon counsel of
record; but Louisiana practice still lacks the liberality of the Federal Rule on
this point.
27. The Appendix of Forms annexed to the Rules "are intended to indi-
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pleading than that followed in any superior court in America. It
is much the same form as that which Louisiana enjoyed 2 until the
unfortunate adoption of the Pleading and Practice Act29 super-
imposed the fact pleading of American code procedure upon the
simple system of the Code of Practice.
As Dean Clark, the Reporter of the Supreme Court Commit-
tee charged with the duty of drafting the new Federal Rules,
once had occasion to observe, we have expected too much of
pleading. "It is a means to an end, not an end in itself-the
'handmaid rather than the mistress' of justice."80 By anticipation
he voiced, some few years ago, the philosophy of the new federal
pleading:
"The aim of pleadings should be therefore to give reason-
able notice of the pleader's case to the opponent and to the
court. This does not go as far as the technical notice pleading,
since it requires notice of the pleader's entire cause, not
merely that he has a claim. The notice to the court is perhaps
the more important, for in general the opponent knows enough
about the case to relieve us of worry about him. In fact we
have spent altogether too much thought over the danger of
surprising a defendant. If his case is prepared at all ade-
quately he will not be surprised. Our solicitude for him will
simply result in giving him opportunities to delay the case
and harass his opponent. The main purpose of the pleadings
should therefore be to give the trial court a proper under-
standing of the case. If the trial court is adequately in-
formed of the issue by the pleadings, it means that the parties
are likewise so informed. It is for the court not the litigants to
vindicate pleading rules."'
The basic pleadings required under the Rules are the com-
plaint, answer, and reply (if the answer contains a counterclaim
denominated as such) .8 Further pleadings allowed are answers
to a cross-claim, third-party complaints and answers thereto; "no
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order
cate . . . the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contem-
plate." Rule 84.
28. Cf. Art. 172, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870.
29. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 as last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1483).
30. Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28.
31. Id. at 30.
32. Rule 7 (a).
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a reply to an answer or a third-party answer." 3 The cursory
reader is apt to conclude that the reply and the answers to a
third-party complaint would be considered as prohibited repli-
cations under Louisiana practice, 4 but despite the difference of
terminology, except in rare and occasional cases, the federal sys-
tem of pleading is exactly the same as our own..
Verification or certification of pleadings is not required under
the Rules, except in the rare case when required by express
statute or rule. All pleadings must be "signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name," and "the signature of
an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter-
posed for delay. '3 6 Breach of this implied certificate subjects
counsel to appropriate disciplinary action.3 7 This method has
very obvious advantages over the useless formality of its counter-
part in Louisiana practice.8
The anachronistic rule of former equity practice that the
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or one witness sustained by corrobo-
rating evidence is now abolished."9 The "proof and half-proof"
33. Ibid. When the answer contains a counterclaim denominated as such,
the filing of a reply thereto is a matter of right; but if the answer does not
set forth such a counterclaim the filing of a reply thereto is subject to the
discretion of the court.
34. Cf. Art. 329, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
35. Plaintiff is required to file .a reply only when the answer sets out a
counterclaim denominated as such; otherwise a reply can be filed only if the
court so orders. Rule 7 (a). Thus, normally no reply to the answer is filed,
as under Louisiana practice. However a difference occurs when the answer
contains a counterclaim denominated as such. Under the new federal pro-
cedure a reply must be filed, Rule 7 (a); under Louisiana practice an answer
to a reconventional demand may, but is not required to, be filed. Young v.
Geter, 174 So. 661, 664 (La. App. 1937). The cross-claim of the Federal Rules
has no analogue in Louisiana procedure. The Code of Practice contemplates
an answer to the call in warranty. Cf. Art. 384, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
The Federal Rules similarly contemplate the filing of an answer to a third-
party complaint; however, the latter go further in permitting the court to
require a reply to a third-party answer. Rule 7 (a).
36. Rule 11. "A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address."
37. Rule 11. Furthermore, if the pleading Is not signed or signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, the pleading may be stricken as
sham and false.
38. Cf. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 (5, 6) as last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483 (5, 6)].
39. This doctrine of equity procedure Is a survival of the proof and half-
proof rules of Romano-canonical law. Cf. Engelmann-Millar, A History of
Continental Civil Procedure (1927) 41-44. In order to escape the difficult
burden of this rule it was customary to pray that the defendant be ordered
to answer, "but not under oath."
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rule which had accounted for this result in federal equity prac-
tice was at one time firmly imbedded in Louisiana practice, but
its influence today is slight.40
The formal requirements of the pleadings under the new
Rules are much the same as under Louisiana practice, with the one
exception that the latter is fact pleading while the former con-
stitute an approach to notice pleading. All -pleadings must be
captioned with the name of the court, the title of the action,4 1
the file number and a designation of the pleading; 2 this is
substantially identical with a well-nigh universal custom in
Louisiana.4 The new Rules further provide that "all averments
of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to
a statement of a single set of circumstances 44 but the similarity of
statement should not cause this rule to be confused with the
basically different Louisiana requirement that the plaintiff shall
"state each of the material facts upon which he bases his claim
for relief in a separate paragraph, separately numbered. '45 The
principle of pleading by reference, highly conducive to brevity,
is recognized both by the new Rules4 6 and Louisiana practice.4 7
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief must contain, in
addition to the jurisdictional allegation when necessary,48 "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" and a prayer for appropriate relief.49 The re-
40. As a rule of evidence, proof and half-proof was abandoned quite early.
Dranguet v. Prudhomme, 3 La. 83 (1831). Originally, the rule was conse-
crated by Art. 354, La. Code of Practice of 1825, insofar as answers to interrog-
atories on facts and articles were concerned; but in the 1870 revision it was
rejected. Cf. Art. 354, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See Rush v. Landers, 107
La. 549, 32 So. 95, 57 L. R. A. 353 (1902). The influence of proof and half-
proof is still visible in Art. 264, La. Code of Practice of 1870, and in La. Act
11 of 1926, amending and re-enacting La. Act 207 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1932)
§§ 2024-2025].
41. In the complaint the title of the cause must include the names of
all parties; in other pleadings it may include the name of the first party on
each side with an appropriate indication of other parties. Rule 10 (a).
42. Rules 7 (a), 10 (a).
43. Although hot required by any code or statutory provision, the preva-
lent custom in Louisiana (except in East Baton Rouge Parish) is to caption
the pleading.
44. Rule 10 (b).
45. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 as last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1483].
46. Rule 10 (c). This rule of adoption by reference applies not only to
exhibits, but likewise to other pleadings and parts of pleadings.
47. Tremont Lumber Co. v. May, 143 La. 389, 78 So. 650 (1918).
48. Jurisdictional averments must be made in the complaint because the
courts are of limited jurisdiction; however, this is rarely done in subsequent
pleadings.
49. Rule 8 (a).
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sponsive pleadings require the pleader to "state in short and plain
terms his defenses to each claim asserted," and further require
a denial or admission of the averments on which the adverse party
relies.50 The denial for lack of sufficient information to justify a
belief is less technical than that of Louisiana practice. 51 The
Rules, in permitting a general denial of all the averments of the
adverse party except such designated averments as are admitted
expressly, are more liberal than the corresponding Louisiana
provision. 52 In both systems, the effect of the failure to deny, in
the responsive pleading, is to admit the averments of the adverse
party.5  The pleading of affirmative defenses under the Rules 54
and special defenses under Louisiana practice55 are similar-
provided that due account be taken of the fact pleading of Louis-
iana. Both systems permit demands for alternative relief,56 as
well as pleading inconsistent causes of action or defenses in the
alternative;5 7 however, the Federal Rules are a little more liberal
in permitting alternative pleading regardless of inconsistency.58 In
50. Rule 8 (b).
51. Rule 8 (b). In Louisiana, "the denial by the defendant ... may be
based upon lack of sufficient information to justify a belief .... but in such
case the denial must be expressly so qualified." La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1(2) as
last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1932) 1 1483 (2)]. An
averment that the pleader lacks sufficient information to justify a belief,
without a denial therefor, would constitute an admission in Louisiana. Mad-
dox v. Robbert, 165 La. 694, 115 So. 905 (1928). Under the new federal practice,
it would constitute a denial. Rule 8 (b).
52. Rule 8 (b). Louisiana does not permit the general denial except as
to all matters admitted expressly, but insists upon a specific denial in each
of the responsive paragraphs. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 (2) as last amended by
La. Act 27 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483 (2)]; Middleton v. Humble, 154
So. 400 (La. App. 1934).
53. Rule 8 (d); La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 (3) as last amended by La. Act 27
of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483 (3)].
54. Rule 8 (c). Affirmative pleading of "accord and satisfaction, arbitra-
tion and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury
by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense" is required.
55. Art. 2232, La. Civil Code of 1870; Byrne v. Hibernia Bank, 31 La. Ann.
81 (1879); Buechner v. City of New Orleans, 112 La. 599, 36 So. 603, 66 L. R. A.
334, 104 Am. St. Rep. 455 (1904); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. Jacobs, 13 La.
App. 1, 126 So. 741 (1930); Weil v. Well, 13 La. App. 8, 126 So. 742 (1930);
Louisiana Mortgage Corp. v. Trotti, 158 So. 692 (La. App. 1935); Martin v. Toye
Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 162 So. 257 (La. App. 1935).
56. Rules 8 (a); 8(e2); Weinburger v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 41 La.
Ann. 31, 5 So. 728 (1888).
57. Rules 8 (a), 8 (e2); Haas v. McCain, 161 La. 114, 108 So. 305 (1926);
Succession of Markham, 180 La. 211, 156 So. 225 (1934); Wells v. Davidson, 149
So. 246 (La. App. 1933).
58. Rule 8 (e2).
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Louisiana the emphasis on the pleading of facts narrows the effec-
tiveness of this procedural device. 9
In the manner of urging technical objections to the pleadings,
the Rules are far in advance of our procedure. Demurrers, pleas
and exceptions for insufficiency of pleading are rejected,6 0 and all
procedural objections must be urged either in the motion to dis-
miss or in the answer1.6  The following defenses may, at the
option of the pleader, be raised either through the motion to
dismiss or the answer or reply: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) im-
proper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of
service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.6 2 All other objections must be raised through the
answer . 6  All defenses or objections which can be raised through
the motion to dismiss can be consolidated in one motion, but
unless a party raises all of the first five objections (of the six
enumerated above) which are then available to him, he waives
the right to raise them through this motion. 64 Similarly, all ob-
jections which are not presented in the motion to dismiss or in the
answer or reply are waived, except those which urge failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter.6 5 In whatever manner the objec-
tion is raised, any party can apply to have it heard and determined
before trial.66
Translated into the terminology of Louisiana practice, it
would seem that all objections which would be raised in Louis-
iana through the declinatory exceptions and the exceptions of no
right (want of interest) or no cause of action may be raised
either through the motion to dismiss or the answer; objections
which would be raised in Louisiana through all other exceptions
must be incorporated in the answer or reply. The rules relative
to waiver prevent any "stringing out" of the procedural objections
and insure the plaintiff getting to trial without undue delay.
59. In Louisiana, the pleading of inconsistent facts in the alternative is
not permitted, unless the true facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the adverse party and are unknown to the pleader. Succession of Markham,
180 La. 211, 156 So. 225 (1934); Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 168 So. 370
(La. App. 1936).
60. Rule 7 (c).
61. Rule 12 (b).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Rule 12 (g).
65. Rule 12 (h).
66. Rule 12 (d).
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Aside from a difference of nomenclature, the federal practice on
this point is not substantially different from the system obtaining
in Louisiana prior to 1839.67 The superior features of a procedure
identical with that of the new Federal Rules have been pointed
out, 8 and Louisiana practice could be improved immeasurably
by borrowing these points.
Three other means of voicing procedural objections are con-
templated by the Rules. The first is the motion to strike redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter from a plead-
ing.' 9 This finds its counterpart in Louisiana practice. 70 The next
is the motion for judgment on the pleadings, 71 similar to but
broader than our motion of the same name.72 The last is the mo-
tion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars,7 3 likewise
broader and much more effective than our exception of vague-
ness.14 Louisiana would do well to borrow this device, not only to
improve its procedure but also to prevent the downright miscar-
riage of justice which its present system tolerates and encour-
ages." Under the brief and general pleadings contemplated by
the new Rules, this motion will be necessary in certain cases to
prevent genuine surprise. However, judging from the Forms
approved by the Rules, the effective use of this motion will not
be as great as might be imagined.
67. See Comment, infra, p. 174.
68. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana (1934)
9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 61 et seq.
69. Rule 12 (f).
70. McMahon, loc. cit. supra note 68, at 31 et seq.
71. Rule 12 (c): "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as
not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."
72. La. Act 157 of 1912, 1 1 (4) as last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483 (4)]. In Louisiana the motion for judgment on
the pleadings is open only to the plaintiff; in the new federal practice it is
available to all parties.
73. Rule 12 (e).
74. The Louisiana exception is available only to the defendant; the new
federal motion is open to all parties.
75. Under Louisiana practice, if the petition is vague the defendant must
except to such generality and obscurity in limine; and if he fails to do so
timely, he waives all objection thereto and evidence will be received in sup-
port of the pleadings. Doullut v. McManus, 37 La. Ann. 800 (18$5). But when
the special defense pleaded in the answer is similarly vague, plaintiff may
successfully object to the introduction of all evidence in support thereof. The
defendant is given no opportunity to amend, such as the plaintiff enjoys after
an exception of vagueness has been maintained. Godchaux v. Hyde, 126 La.
187, 52 So. 269 (1910); Ouachita Nat. Bank v. Mcllhenny, 169 La. 258, 125 So.
69 (1929); Bloomenstiel v. McKeithen, 19 La. App. 513, 139 So. 519 (1932);
Arcadia Lumber Co. v. Austin, 15 La. App. 212, 131 So. 601 (1930); Quatray v.
Wicker, 16 La. App. 515, 134 So. 313 (1931); McDonald v. Stellwagon, 140 So.
133 (La. App. 1932); Martin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 162 So. 257 (La.
App. 1935). It has been held that even though the defendant discover his
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The cross-claim is sanctioned by the new Rules as follows:
"A pleading may state as a cross-claim by 6ne party against a
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claim-
ant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
cross-claimant."7 6 This is particularly helpful to a defendant in
asserting rights against a co-defendant. It has no counterpart in
Louisiana, the closest approach being the call in warranty.
The counterclaim provided by the new Rules 7  is not only
extensive enough to include both the incidental demands of com-
pensation 78 and reconvention7 9 but is much broader and more
liberal than the two devices named. The filing of a counterclaim
is compulsory if the claim in question "arises out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdic-
tion."' 0 It is permissive if the claim does not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence." A counterclaim omitted through over-
sight, inadvertence or excusable neglect may, with leave of court,
be presented by supplemental pleading.2 Separate trials of origi-
nal claim and counterclaim are permitted within the discretion
of the court.83 Here again Louisiana practice suffers from a com-
parison. Our unfortunate requirements that a claim pleaded in
compensation must be equally liquidated, 84 and that one forming
error prior to trial and plead the defense with particularity in an amended
answer, the amendment will not be allowed. Martin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab
Co., supra. This harsh and technical rule sacrifices substantial rights of the
client because of the harmless negligence of his counsel. The adoption of the
motion contemplated by the Rules would prevent such denials of justice.
76. Rule 13 (g).
77. Rule 13 (a-f).
78. Arts. 366-373, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
79. Arts. 374-377, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
80. Rule 13 (a).
81. Rule 13 (b).
82. Rule 13 (f). Even if the counterclaim matures, or Is acquired, after
the filing of the party's pleadings, it can with leave of court be presented by a
supplemental pleading. Rule 13 (e).
83. Rule 13 (i).
84. Art. 2209, La. Civil Code of 1870. The reason for this was to prevent
the defendant from delaying the case through the interposition of a plea of
compensation, the evidence of which could not be presented within the same
time required for the introduction of evidence of the main demand. "Liqui-
dated" in the civil law meant "readily susceptible of proof." Cf. Caldwell v.
Davis, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 135 (La. 1824). Today, through the influence of the com-
mon law meaning of the term, it has been twisted around to mean "fixed and
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the basis of a reconventional demand must arise out of or be
connected with the main demand unless the residence of the
parties be different,8 5 restrict unnecessarily the effective use of
these procedural devices. The parties should be offered every
inducement to adjudicate all their controversies in a single suit
wherever practicable.
The intervention regulated by the Rules" is substantially
identical in scope with the combined effect of the Louisiana inter-
vention and third opposition,87 despite the separate federal pro-
visions for intervention of right and permissive intervention.8
The third-party practice89 is quite similar to the Louisiana
call in warranty, 0 but it is broader in two respects. First, it per-
mits the defendant to become a third-party plaintiff even after an-
swer filed; 91 in Louisiana apparently this would be impossible.92
Second, the plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against
the third-party defendant any claim which might have been as-
serted against the third-party defendant had he been joined origi-
nally as a defendant.95 Louisiana has no equivalent of this
highly convenient practice. When the defendant asserts a count-
erclaim,14 the new Rules expressly permit a plaintiff to bring in a
third party and this is also the Louisiana practice insofar as the
defendant in reconvention is concerned. 5
In addition to the benefits of brevity and precision of state-
ment, the new Rules have several advantages over the correspond-
determinate." Cf. Moore v. Hamilton, 16 La. App. 630, 133 So. 790 (1931). Thus
the historic reason for the rule has lost its significance, and the rule itself has
developed into something entirely different from what the redactors of the
Code intended.
85. Art. 375, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 50 of
1886.
86. Rule 24.
87. Arts. 389-403, La. Code of Practice of 1870. 'The third opposition of
Louisiana practice is nothing more than a specific type of intervention.
88. Rule 24 (a, b). The reason for the permissive intervention is to retain
judicial control so as to prevent delay and prejudicing of the rights of the
parties by the Intervention. These dangers are obviated by Art. 391, La.
Code of Practice of 1870.
89. Rule 14.
90. Arts. 378-388, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
91. Rule 14 (a).
92. Cf. Art, 3S2, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The prohibition against
change of Issue after contestatio litis in all probability would prevent a de-
fendant from filing a supplemental answer containing the call in warranty.
93. Rule 14 (a).
94. Rule 14 (b).
95. The plaintiff in the main demand becomes the defendant in the re-
conventional demand, and it would seem that he would be permitted to call
a third party in warranty on the demand in reconvention. Cf. Art. 380, La.
Code of Practice of 1870.
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ing Louisiana practice in the amendment of pleadings. There are
no such unworkable limitations upon amendability as the Louisi-
ana proscription against any amendment which changes the
issue." Each litigant may "amend his pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or
if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is per-
mitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party. 9 7 However, lib-
erality of amendment is insured through a mandate to the trial
courts.98 Similarly to modern Louisiana practice" the amendment
relates back to the date of the pleading sought to be amended.10 0
One great advantage over Louisiana practice is the permission
given, within the discretion of the trial court, to supplement the
pleadings so as to set forth transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
amended. 10' Whereas evidence admitted without timely objection
serves to enlarge the pleadings in Louisiana, 10 the same result
is effected by the new Rules in permitting amendment (within
the discretion of the court) so as to conform to the evidence, but
providing that failure to so amend will not affect the result of
the trial of such issues. The new federal practice is broader, how-
ever, in permitting amendment even when timely objection to
evidence is made on the ground that it is not within the issues
96. Cf. Arts. 419-420, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Actually, the interpre-
tation placed upon these code provisions gives rise to a dual standard to test
whether the Issue has been changed. Thus, "the plaintiff may, with the leave
of the court, amend his original petition; provided the amendment does not
alter the substance of his demand by making it different from the one
originally brought." Art. 419, La. Code of Practice of 1870. But the unfor-
tunate statement of the rule as to amendment of answer by a simple ref-
erence to the foregoing has caused difficulty. Consequently, unless the de-
fendant changes his prayer (which need never be done), he may amend his
answer so as to set up new defenses. Meyer v. Farmer, 36 La. Ann. 785
(1884); Southport Mill v. Friedrichs, 167 La. 101, 118 So. 818 (1928).
97. Rule 15 (a).
98. "Leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires."
Rule 15 (a).
99. Reeves v. Globe Indemnity Co. of New York, 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488
(1936) and cases cited therein.
100. Provided "the claim or defense asserted In the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading." Rule 15 (c).
101. Rule 15 (d). Cf. Bell v. Williams' Adm'r, 10 La. 514 (1837).
102. Both the Louisiana rule and its exception are stated clearly in Baden
v. Globe Indemnity Co., 145 So. 53 (La. App. 1932).
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made by the pleadings. The court may grant a continuance to
the adverse party in the event that he is surprised.""3
PRE-TRIAL PRACTICE-With full appreciation of the fact that
pre-trial practice' may not be necessary in federal district
courts whose dockets are not congested, discretion is granted to
district courts to adopt this time and labor saving device by rule
if they deem it necessary. 10 5 Due to the absence of the common
law trial by jury in Louisiana,108 dockets of our trial courts never
reach the point of congestion, except in rare and purely temporary
periods. Under such circumstances there would not appear to be
any genuine need for pre-trial practice in Louisiana at this time.
PARTIES-As under Louisiana practice,107 all actions under
the new Rules must be instituted in the name of the real party
at interest. 08 Generally speaking, the capacity of an individual
or corporation to sue or be sued is to be determined by the law
of the domicile of the individual or corporation. 10 9 A noteworthy
change of viewpoint is that now both partnerships and unincorp-
orated associations may sue and be sued in their common names
when, but only when, a federal question is involved."0 Louisiana
practice always recognizes the entity status of partnerships which
consequently may sue or be sued in their common names;" the
unincorporated association may be sued in its common name;1 2
103. Rule 15 (b).
104. See Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-trial Procedure
(1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 215. This article is condensed in (1937) 21 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 125. See also, Rule 16.
105. Rule 16.
106. In Louisiana appeal lies both as to law and fact. La. Const. of 1921,
Art. VII, §§ 10, 29. By reason of this power to review a jury's findings of
fact, there is no right to a "trial by jury" in the same sense in which the
common law knows the term. Except in Orleans Parish where jury trials
are used to some slight extent, civil jury trials are extremely rare in Louisi-
ana.
107. Art. 15, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
108. Rule 17 (a). Legal representatives are expressly included as real
parties at interest. Suits on bonds prescribed by statutes of the United States
must be Instituted in the name of the United States if the statute so pre-
scribes.
109. Rule 17 (b). The exception pertains to legal representatives.
110. Rule 17 (b). This rule affirms the doctrines of Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co., 288 U. S. 476, 53 S. Ct. 447, 77 L. Ed. 903 (1933) and United Mine
Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L.
Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762 (1922).
111. Key v. Box, 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859); Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made
Pants Co., 52 La. Ann. 1357, 27 So. 893 (1900); Hayes Machinery Co. v. East-
ham, 147 La. 347, 84 So. 898 (1920); American Photo Player Co. v. Simon, 151
La. 708, 92 So. 307 (1922); Snyder v. Davison, 172 La. 274, 134 So. 89 (1931);
First Nat. Bank v. Knighton Bros., 16 La. App. 407, 134 So. 706 (1931).
112. La. Act 170 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1295]. See Sheridan v.
Thibodaux Benevolent Ass'n, 19 La. App. 762, 766, 134 So. 360, 362 (1931).
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but all actions accruing to it must be enforced in the names of
its members. 113 Under both systems, incompetent parties may
sue or be sued through their legal representatives, if there be
such."' The new Rules are slightly broader than our practice in
permitting an incompetent who has no representative to sue by
his next friend or guardian ad litem,"5 and in permitting actions
against him to be brought through a guardian ad litem.-0
With regard to actions at law, a marked improvement is
effected by Rule 18 (a) which permits the joinder of different
causes of action, either independently or alternatively. This has
been the law of Louisiana since 1825.11 Another advance, of
great importance in actions to set aside a fraudulent conveyance,
is that "whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after
another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims
may be joined in a single action."" 8 Louisiana has long permitted
this practice. 119
Any comparison on the subject of joinder of parties is ex-
tremely difficult. This is due, not to any lack of precision of
statement in the new Rules, but to the uncertainty of Louisiana
law following the unfortunate decision of Gill v. City of Lake
Charles.120 Only a comparison of the most general principles will
113. Art. 446, La. Civil Code of 1870; Soller v. Mouton, 3 La. Ann. 541 (1848);
Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877);
Anti-Vice Committee of Shreveport v. Simon, 151 La. 494, 91 So. 851 (1922);
Klein v. Anderson, 4 Orl. App. 262 (1907). But see Executive Committee of
French Opera Trades Ball v. Tarrant, 164 La. 83, 88, 113 So. 774, 776, 53 A. L. R.
1233 (1927); Sheridan v. Thibodaux Benevolent Ass'n, 19 La. App. 762, 766, 134
So. 360, 362 (1931). For a criticism of the Tarrant case, see McMahon, Parties
Litigant in Louisiana-I (1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 489, 505.
114. Rule 17 (c). Louisiana practice: MINORs-Art. 157, La. Civil Code
of 1870, as last amended by La. Act 74 of 1924; Art. 221, La. Civil Code of
1870, as last amended by La. Act 197 of 1924; Art. 246, La. Civil Code of 1870,
as amended by La. Act 72 of 1924; Art. 250, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended
by La. Act 196 of 1924; INTERDIcTS-Arts. 389, 422, 1784, 1788, La. Civil Code of
1870; Art. 109, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
115. Rule 17 (c). In Louisiana the proper representative must be ap-
pointed before the rights of incompetents may be enforced. This works no
particular hardship since the parties interested in the incompetent can
always provoke the proper appointment.
116. Rule 17 (c). Differently from the new federal practice, Louisiana
procedure would not permit the appointment of a curator-ad-hoc for an in-
sane party who had never been interdicted nor committed. Art. 964, La. Code
of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 308 of 1910. This causes no par-
ticular hardship, however, since the creditor may provoke the appointment
of a curator. Interdiction of Giacona, 158 La. 148, 103 So. 721 (1925).
117. Art. 148, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870. On the subject of
alternative pleading, see the cases cited supra notes 56-57.
118. Rule 18 (b). This provision overruled Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106,
11 S. Ct. 712, 35 L. Ed. 358 (1891).
119. Art. 1972, La. Civil Code of 1870.
120. 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907). Prior to this decision, Louisiana had
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be attempted here. Under federal procedure, every person having
a joint interest is deemed an indispensable party and must be
joined;12 1 "necessary parties" 122 must be joined if they are subject
to the jurisdiction of the court both as to service and venue,
otherwise it is discretionary with the trial judge as to whether
the action shall proceed without them.1" 8 However, even if the
case proceeds without such necessary parties as cannot be served
or whose presence in the suit would divest the court of jurisdic-
tion, "the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights
or liabilities of absent persons."'12 4 Corresponding procedural rules
of Louisiana are somewhat different, because if all parties whose
rights will be affected by the decree are not joined, the court
cannot render judgment thereon.125  And if a person, whose
presence in the litigation is proper yet not indispensable, has
not been joined, this will be required by the court on timely ob-
jection of defendant. If he should be joined as plaintiff and
refuses to do so he must be joined as a defendant.126
The new Rules concerning permissive joinder of parties are
simple and are beautifully stated:
"All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
settled all questions of "joinder of parties" by application of settled prin-
ciples of Romano-canonical law relative to cumulation of actions. Cf.
Kennedy v. Oakey, 3 Rob. 404 (La. 1843); Waldo & Hughes v. Angomar, 12
La. Ann. 74 (1857). All three of the statements of the court In Gill v. City of
Lake Charles, supra, were erroneous. Firstly, Spanish procedure did have
adequate rules on the subject. See Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos (1798 ed.)
Parte II, Lib. III, Tom. I, p. 61; Millar, Joinder of Actions in Continental
Civil Procedure (1933) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 177, 194. Secondly, our early Louisiana
cases did not look to the common law for guidance as to joinder of parties.
Thirdly, the court did not (as it thought) in Gill v. City of Lake Charles,
supra, cite with approval common law authorities on the subject of joinder
of parties. What it cited were texts and precedents concerning multifarious-
ness in equity practice-an entirely different matter. The latter, springing
from the same Romano-canonical base as did our own practice, had rules
quite similar to if not identical with the rules applied in our early cases.
No particular damage was done Louisiana practice until quite recently, when
the courts began to take the Gill case at its word and apply common law
rules of joinder of parties. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in
McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana-III, to appear in an early issue of the
Tulane Law Review.
121. Rule 19 (a).
122. On the subject of necessary and indispensable parties, see Dobie,
Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1928) 484-486.
123. Rule 19 (b).
124. Ibid.
125. Succession of Todd, 165 La. 453, 115 So. 653 (1928) and cases cited
therein.
126. Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931); Pierce v. Robertson,
182 So. 544 (La. 1938).
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in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all will arise in the action. All persons
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action., 12,
This is substantially the same rule which obtained in Louisiana
under the early cases, 128 and substantially the same rule as to
multifariousness which Gill v. City of Lake Charles12 9 announced
under the misapprehension that it was voicing the common law
rule as to joinder of parties. Separate trials may be ordered
within the discretion of federal district courts, so as to prevent
delay and prejudice to the parties through permissive joinder.130
The Louisiana rules of severance are substantially in accord.' 1
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action
under either system.'3 2 Under the new Rules "parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just."'' 83 Such a liberal and simple rule is worthy of adoption
in Louisiana.
Rule 22, and the Federal Interpleader Statute 4 which it con-
templates, enjoy marked superiority over the Louisiana Inter-
pleader Act.'3 5 In the first place our statute protects only the
stake holder in "possession of money," and furthermore it is
127. Rule 20 (a). "A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in
obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be
given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights
to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective
liabilities." Ibid.
128. See cases cited supra note 120.
129. 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
130. Rules 20 (b), 21.
131. Sere v. Armitage, 9 Mart. 394, 13 Am. Dec. 311 (La. 1821); Mathews
v. De Laronde, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 505 (La. 1830); Schwing v. Dunlap, 130 La. 498,
58 So. 162 (1912); Driefus v. Levy, 140 So. 259 (La. App. 1932). Flemming's For-
mulary (3d ed. 1933) 132 strikes a discordant note when, in connection with
Its form on the rule for severance, it says: "This form is rarely used, as a
plea of misjoinder might accomplish the same thing." This is erroneous. The
rule of severance Is used when, and only when, the exception of misjoinder
has been or would be overruled.
132. Rule 21; Morgan v. Tolle, 168 La. 496, 122 So. 594 (1929).
133. Rule 21.
134. Judicial Code, § 24 (26) as amended, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) as last
amended by 49 Stat. 1096 (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (1937).
135. La. Act 123 of 1922 [Dart's Stats. (1932) If 1556-1563].
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much too narrow because it forces a person to admit liability
judicially before permitting him to resort to the act. Federal
practice, on the other hand, permits a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader, whereby a person may implead all claimants and deny
liability, thus adjudicating the liability as well as the respective
rights of the claimants. Louisiana would do well to pattern its
interpleader procedure upon this new practice.
The status of class actions in Louisiana practice is still too
nebulous to permit of any comparison with the similar procedure
contemplated by Rule 23.18 6
Substitution of parties as regulated by Rule 25 is substantially
the same as the customary Louisiana practice on the subject.'
DEPbSITIONS AND DIscovERY-The two general types of deposi-
tions-upon oral examination3 8 and upon written interrogato-
ries'P-as well as their procedure are substantially the same as
under Louisiana practice. However, the time at which deposi-
tions may be taken differs. In Louisiana, with but one exception,
no depositions may be taken until after joinder of issue;'"0 while
under the new federal practice depositions may be taken by leave
of court as soon as service of process has been made, and after
service of the answer they may be taken as of right.' 4'
The scope of examination in such cases is much broader and
136. See Executive Committee of French Opera Trades Ball v. Tarrant,
164 La. 83, 88, 113 So. 774, 776, 53 A. L. R. 1233 (1927); Orlando v. Nix, 171 La.
176, 129 So. 810 (1930) and cases cited therein.
137. Arts. 113, 120, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Rule XIV of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana [1 Dart's Stats. (1932) pp. 523-524]. The general custom
on points not covered by these authorities is substantially Identical with the
results of Rule 25.
138. Rule 30; La. Act 143 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) §§ 1998.1-1998.5].
This Is the type erroneously termed by the profession in Louisiana-probably
because of the error in terminology committed in La. Act 98 of 1926 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 19961-as depositions de bene esse. The latter are merely pro-
visional testimony to be used exclusively in cases where the witness is dead
or absent at the time of trial. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3d ed. Rev. 1914)
848-850. The closest approach in Louisiana to depositions de bene esse is the
perpetuation of testimony. Cf. Arts. 138, 430, 440, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
Under Louisiana practice the party seeking to take depositions upon oral
examination must obtain leave of court through a motion heard contradic-
torily with the adverse party. La. Act 143 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp,
1937) § 1998.1]. The federal practice permits the party to serve notice of his
Intention to take such depositions upon the adverse party, leaving the latter
free to secure relief from the court against any abuse of the privilege. Rule
80 (b, d).
139. Rule 31; Arts. 424-439, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Act 34 of 1922
[Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 2008-2010].
140. Soule v. West, 180 La. 1092, 158 So. 567 (1935).
141. Rule 27 (al).
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more liberal than the Louisiana practice. Thus Rule 26 (b) pro-
vides that
"the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of
the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tan-
gible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts."
Quite evidently, this renders something more than lip service to
the truism that a litigant has no proprietory right in any evidence
within his possession or under his control. Discretion is vested in
the court to prevent this privilege from being abused.142
Perhaps the greatest weakness of modern Louisiana practice
is the complete absence of any adequate discovery procedure. 4 '
In view of our own apparent attitude of preventing the truth from
becoming known, the discovery provisions of the new Rules are
most enlightening. As a counterpart of our interrogatories on
facts and articles4 the new Rules offer the interrogatories to
adverse parties, with a more workable rule on interposing objec-
tions to the answers thereto.' Upon motion, the adverse party
may be compelled to produce any of his tangible evidence for
purposes of inspection, copying or photographing; and he may
further be compelled to permit inspection and photographing of
land or other property within his possession. 146 Any Louisiana
practitioner who has had to establish the authenticity of numer-
ous documents under private signature in a trial in the state
courts will be particularly interested in the following excerpt
from Rule 36 (a):
"At any time after the pleadings are closed, a party may
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission
by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents
142. Rule 30 (b, d).
143. Interrogatories on facts and articles (Arts. 347-355, La. Code of
Practice of 1870), the subpoena duces tecum returnable prior to date of trial
(John B. Murison & Co. v. Butler, 18 La. Ann. 296 (1866); Succession of
Marks, 108 La. 494, 32 So. 401 (1902)), and perpetuation of testimony (Arts.
138, 430, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Art. 440, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as
amended by La. Act 112 of 1914) constitute the closest approaches of Louisiana
practice to discovery procedure. The latter has been rendered well nigh
valueless by State ex rel. Batt v. Rome, 172 La. 856, 135 So. 610 (1931).
144. Arts. 347-355, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
145. Rule 33.
146. Rule 34.
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described in and exhibited with the request or the truth of any
relevant matters of fact set forth therein.... Each of the mat-
ters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed ad-
mitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not
less than 10 days after service thereof or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party
to whom the request is directed serves upon the party request-
ing the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically
the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth
in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit
or deny those matters."
Proceedings to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses or of
the party form an important part of the new discovery procedure.
At first blush this procedure would appear to be broader than,
but otherwise similar to, perpetuation of testimony in Louisiana
practice. 4 7 A closer examination proves, however, that while the
perpetuation of testimony forms an important cog in the federal
discovery procedure, it is utterly useless for that purpose in Louis-
iana practice. Under the latter, the party seeking to perpetuate
testimony can do so only at the peril of making a hostile witness
and even the adverse party his own witness-as such vouching
for his credibility, precluded from impeaching his testimony and
prevented from asking him leading questions. 4 8
Differently from the former federal rule,4 the new practice
requires a party whose mental or physical condition is in contro-
versy to submit to an examination. 5 The same result is obtained
in Louisiana practice through a different approach.-" However,
the new federal practice has two advantages over our own sys-
147. Rule 27; Arts. 138, 430, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Art. 440, La.
Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 112 of 1914. Under the new
federal practice any party may perpetuate testimony of all witnesses or
parties either pending trial or prior to suit filed. Rule 27 (al, c). Under Louis-
iana practice only the testimony of witnesses who are aged, infirm, or about
to depart from the state may be perpetuated pending trial. Art. 430, supra.
Prior to trial the testimony of all persons might be perpetuated. Art. 440,
supra.
148. State ex rel. Batt v. Rome, 172 La. 856, 135 So. 610 (1931). Cf. Rules 26
(c, f), 27 (a3), 43 (b).
149. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L.
Ed. 734 (1891). But if a state statute required such an examination, it would
have been enforced in the federal courts under the former practice. Camden
& Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 617, 44 L. Ed. 721 (1900).
150. Rule 35 (a).
151. Cf. Grant v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 129 La. 811, 56 So. 897
(1911); Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777
(1918); Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La. App. 187, 123 So. 166 (1929). Louisiana takes
the position that while a party cannot be forced to submit to such an examt-
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tern: the examination is held at a time and place specified by the
court and not by the adverse party; and the party examined is
entitled to secure a copy of the written report of the examining
physician.15 2 Penalties for failure to make discovery are in all
cases within the discretion of the court, but may include punish-
ment for contempt and taking the fact sought to be discovered as
confessed.158
If a law suit is a search for truth, then no one could object
to the provisions of the new Rules relative to discovery. The
greatest single improvement which could be effected in Louisiana
practice would be a statute adopting all features of the new
federal discovery procedure.
TRIALS-"The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States [is] preserved to the parties inviolate."' 1 However,
the new Rules made a most important change from the former
practice where jury trials in actions at law were had unless
waived by all parties, and shifted the burden of inertia by forcing
one of the parties to demand jury trial under penalty of it being
waived.' This procedure is one of the many contributions of
Louisiana practice to American procedural law. 58 Under the new
Rules a party may specify the issues which he wishes tried by
jury.157 If jury trial has been demanded by one of the parties
it may not be waived except by consent of all parties.' 5 Further-
more, the court may of its own motion have the case tried with-
out a jury if it concludes that under the law right to a jury trial
does not exist."59 Conversely, even when the parties have waived
jury trial, the court may in its discretion require it.'"°
Discretion is vested in the federal district courts to provide,
through rules of their own, the procedure for assigning cases for
trial.'0 '
nation, since his refusal has precluded any rebuttal of the evidence which he
may introduce as to his condition, the latter is excluded as being ex parte.
152. Rule 35 (b).
153. Rule 37.
154. Rule 38 (a).
155. Rule 38 (b, d).
156. Arts. 494-495, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870. Louisiana was
the first jurisdiction in America to require that jury trial be demanded spe-
cially.
157. Rule 38 (c).
158. Rule 39 (a).
159. Ibid.
160. Rule 39 (b).
161. Rule 40.
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The rules relating to the dismissal of actions under the new
federal practice appear to be much more liberal than and superior
to the corresponding rules of Louisiana practice. An action may
be dismissed by stipulation of all the parties at any time, and by
the plaintiff filing a notice of dismissal at any time prior to service
of answer. Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation,
such dismissal is without prejudice, except that voluntary dis-
missal operates as res judicata when effected through notice of a
plaintiff who had previously dismissed his case in any state or
federal court. 1 2 Except as stated above, no action may be dis-
missed without an order of court which may fix the terms and
conditions thereof. "If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a de-
fendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for inde-
pendent adjudication by the court."'163 Corresponding Louisiana
practice is too uncertain to make any detailed comparison feas-
ible.""
On motion of defendant the action may be dismissed for
plaintiff's failure to prosecute, or for failure to comply with the
Rules or any order of court. On the close of plaintiff's case de-
fendant (with full right to introduce testimony if the motion is
overruled) may also move to dismiss on the ground that under
the law and facts plaintiff has shown no rights to relief. 65 The
latter would appear to be the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict of the former federal practice under a new name. It has
no counterpart in Louisiana; 66 although its adoption would seem
advisable. 67 Involuntary dismissal, unless the order therefor
otherwise specifies, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.68
162. Rule 41 (al).
163. Rule 41 (a2).
164. "The plaintiff may, in every state of the suit previous to judgment
being rendered, discontinue the suit on paying the costs." Art. 491, La. Code
of Practice of 1870. At one time It seemed that the following exceptions to
this general rule were recognized: (1) After evidence had been adduced on
the trial, discontinuance was allowed within the discretion of the court; and
(2) No discontinuance was permitted: (a) when defendant had prayed for
damages for dissolution of plaintiff's conservatory writ; or (b) when a recon-
ventional demand had been filed; or (c) when plaintiff's right of action had
been seized by a creditor. State ex rel. Gondran v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So.
256 (1896). However, under more recent cases it would seem probable that
the only exception to the general rule of discontinuance is after a reconven-
tional demand had been filed. Smith v. New Orleans Public Service, 179 So.
606 (La. App. 1938) and cases cited therein.
165. Rule 41 (b).
166. Dougherty v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 9 La. App. 295, 119 So. 543 (1928).
167. Such procedure would tend to shorten the trial of cases where the
plaintiff fails to prove a right to the relief demanded.
168. Rule 41 (b).
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Similarly to Louisiana practice, under the new Rules the
court may order the consolidation of actions involving common
questions of law or fact so as to secure a joint hearing or trial.16
The new federal practice goes further, however, in adopting the
converse rule which permits the judge to order "separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, count-
erclaims, third-party claims, or issues."'7 0
The greatest liberality as to evidence is effected by the new
Rules. Thus, "all evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evi-
dence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held.'' 1 1 The statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs. 7 2 The new Federal Rules
are slightly broader than Louisiana practice in permitting a party
to lead an unwilling or hostile witness.173 On the other hand, the
Louisiana statute is somewhat broader than pertinent provisions
of the new Rules on the subject of cross-examination of the ad-
verse party, or of an officer or managing agent thereof. 74 Both
systems of procedure have abolished bills of exceptions; 7 5 and
both appear to have adopted similar methods of making a record
of excluded evidence. 176
An excellent provision is that of Rule 43 (e), concerning
hearings on contradictory motions. When a motion is based on
facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties or may direct that
169. Rule 42 (a); Arts. 422-423, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
170. Rule 42 (b).
171. Rule 43 (a).
172. Ibid.
173. Rule 43 (b).
174. La. Act 115 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) H§ 1995-1995.21 permits
the cross-examination of the particular officer or "other representatives" of a
corporation, partnership or other legal entity, thus permitting cross-examina-
tion of the servant or agent of the adverse party having knowledge of the
pertinent facts. The new federal practice is somewhat narrower. Cf. Rule
43 (b).
175. Rule 46; La. Act. 61 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1974].
176. Under both practices if an objection to testimony is sustained the
examining attorney may make a specific offer of what he expects to prove by
such testimony. Rule 43 (c); La. Act 61 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1974].
Under the new Rules, if the case is not tried before a jury, the court may
allow the full testimony to be reduced to writing. Rule 43 (c). Louisiana
practice effects the same results in all cases under the ruling of the trial
judge to "Let the objection go to the effect, rather than to the admissibility."
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the matter be heard wholly or in part on oral testimony or deposi-
tions. A similar provision in our injunction statute17 has proven
workable, and the practice might be extended to the hearing of
all exceptions and rules in Louisiana.
With the exceptions noted hereinafter, both systems have
substantially similar procedures for subpoenas 7 and subpoenas
to compel the production of documentary evidence. 179 However,
under the new Rules both subpoenas and subpoenas for the pro-
duction of documentary evidence may be issued by the clerk,
"signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting
it, who shall fill it in before service."8 0 Service of subpoenas may
be made by the marshal, or his deputy, or by another person who
is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age.'
8
1
The new Rules retain the very excellent procedure of the
former federal practice as to examination of prospective jurors,
either by the parties or their attorneys, or by the court. In the
latter case, the examination may be supplemented by further
inquiry of the parties or their counsel; or the court itself may sub-
mit such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as
it sees fit.'8 2 Our local practice contemplates examination only by
the parties or their counsel, 83 and any one who has witnessed
the examination of prospective jurors by the federal judge can
appreciate the reasons why the new Rules retained the former
practice. Differently from Louisiana practice, the court is per-
mitted to call one or two alternate jurors to serve if any of the
regular panel subsequently become incapacitated or disquali-
fied.8 4 By stipulation of counsel, a jury may be less than twelve
and a verdict of a stated majority shall be taken as the verdict of
the jury.18 5
Differently from Louisiana practice, 8 6 the court may require
the jury to return only special verdicts in the form of written
findings upon each issue of fact.18 7 A new device permits the
177. La. Act. 29 of 1924, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2079].
178. Rule 45 (a); Art. 134, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La.
Act 113 of 1922; Arts. 135, 469-472, La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Rev. Stats.
of 1870, § 3959 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1979].
179. Rule 45 (b); Arts 139-143, 473-475, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
180. Rule 45 (a).
181. Rule 45 (c).
182. Rule 47 (a).
183. Art. 509, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
184. Rule 47 (b).
185. Rule 48.
186. Art. 520, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
187. Rule 49 (a).
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court to "submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for
a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues
of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict."' 18 If such
answers are harmonious with the general verdict, judgment shall
be entered upon the verdict. If the answers are consistent with
each other but one or more are not harmonious with the general
verdict, the court may order a new trial or return the case to the
jury for further consideration or may direct the entry of judg-
ment in accord with the answers. When the answers are not
harmonious either with themselves or the general verdict the
court may order a new trial or return the case to the jury for fur-
ther consideration. 189
The new federal practice retains the old motion for a directed
verdict but has simplified the procedure in two respects. In the
first place, the mover has the right, without express reservation,
to introduce evidence if the motion is overruled; and secondly,
even though all parties may have moved for directed verdicts
this fact no longer constitutes a waiver of jury trial.10 The former
inability of the judge to render judgment contrary to the ver-
dict"' has been modified so that whenever a motion for directed
verdict has been denied or not granted for any reason, the "court
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. 1 92
Within 10 days after reception of a verdict (or within 10 days
from the discharge of the jury if no verdict was returned) the
party who moved for a directed verdict may move to have the ver-
dict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judg-
ment entered in accord with the motion for a directed verdict.
Such party may join with this motion a motion for a new trial, or
may pray for the latter in the alternative. If a verdict has been
received the court may either allow the judgment to stand or may
reopen the case and either order a new trial or direct the entry
of a judgment as if the verdict requested had been directed. If
no verdict has been returned the court may direct the entry of
judgment as if the verdict requested had been directed or may
188. Rule 49 (b).
189. Ibid.
190. Rule 50 (a).
191. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 33 S. Ct. 523, 57
L. Ed. 879, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1029 (1913). Cf. Baltimore and Carolina Line v.
Redman, 295 U. S. 654, 55 S. Ct. 890, 79 L. Ed. 1636 (1935).
192. Rule 50 (b).
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order a new trial.19" Louisiana practice has not the remotest
analogy to the federal procedure outlined above.
The two systems have substantially the same rules regarding
the judge's instructions to the jury, the parties' right to request
special charges and the time of objecting to the charge.194 How-
ever, there is a tremendous difference between the two because
the federal judge enjoys the power to comment on the evidence
which is denied the trial judge in Louisiana. 19
Where the case is tried by the court without a jury, special
findings of fact must be stated separately from the conclusions
of law. 9 16 Similarly to Louisiana practice, these findings of fact
are reviewable on appeal. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility. of the
witnesses.' 1 97 The new Rules go further than our practice, how-
ever, in permitting the court to amend its findings of fact and the
judgment rendered-without the necessity of granting a new trial
(or rehearing) -on motion made within 10 days after entry of
judgment. 198
JUDGMENT-Differently from Louisiana practice the federal
court may render judgment as to one or more of a plurality of
claims, thus terminating the action with respect to such claim,
but proceding therewith with respect to all remaining claims.'99
Except in case of judgment by default, the court "shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor [the judgment] is ren-
dered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. '20  The same result is obtained in Louisiana
under the pleading's prayer for general relief.20 1 Ordinarily costs
are imposed upon the party cast in judgment, but the new Rules
confer discretion upon the trial court to direct otherwise. 20 2 This
discretionary power has obvious advantages over the arbitrary
rule in the trial courts of Louisiana. 23
193. Ibid.
194. Rule 51; Arts. 515-517, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
195. Art. 516, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
196. Rule 52 (a).
197. Ibid.
198. Rule 52 (b).
199. Rule 54 (b).
200. Rule 54 (c).
201. Cf. Kinder v. Scharff, 125 La. 594, 51 So. 654 (1910); Haas v. Irion, 125
La. 1034, 52 So. 149 (1910).
202. Rule 54 (d).
203. Costs are always imposed by trial courts upon the party cast. Arts.
549, 551-552, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The appellate courts, however, are
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Under the new Rules a judgment by default may be entered
by the clerk of court when the demand is for "a sum certain or
for a sum which can by computation be made certain." ' All
other default judgments must be rendered by the court itself.20 5
Whenever any inquiry is necessary to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any statement by evidence,
the court may conduct such hearing or make whatever references
it may deem necessary. Trial by jury in default cases is extended
to the parties when required by any statute of the United States.
If the party against whom judgment is sought has appeared in
the action, written notice of the application for default judgment
must be made at least three days prior to the hearing thereon.20
Rendition of default judgments against incompetents is prohibited
unless there has been an appearance by the legal representa-
tives.207
Under Louisiana practice the plaintiff may move for judg-
ment in whole or in part if, on the face of the pleadings, no
defense sufficient in law has been pleaded which would prevent
plaintiff from obtaining some or all of the relief prayed for.20 8
The summary judgment procedure of the new Federal Rules
broadens the scope of this device by extending it to all parties
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim. 20 9
Even more important, however, is that under the new federal
practice the motion for summary judgment is not triable only
on the face of the pleadings; the parties are permitted to support
or oppose the motion by affidavits which the court may consider.
These affidavits shall "set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compe-
tent to testify to the matters stated therein. ' '210 "The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions
empowered to assess costs at their discretion. La. Act 229 of 1910, § 2 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1977].
204. Rule 55 (bl).
205. Rule 55 (b2).
206. Ibid.
207. "No judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incom-
petent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, com-
mittee, conservator, or other such representative who has appeared therein."
Rule 55 (b2). The Rules are silent as to the procedure to be followed when
the incompetent's legal representative does not appear. Rule 55 (b2). Appar-
ently, the court's power to punish for contumacy would be a sufficient sanction
to enforce a court order requiring such appearance.
208. La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1 (4) as last amended by La. Act 27 of 1926
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1483 (4) ].
209. Rule 56 (a).
210. Rule 56 (e).
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or by further affidavits.' A similar broadening of the scope of
the present Louisiana procedure on the subject would be a mate-
rial improvement.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment in the
federal courts is provided by statute,2 12 and this procedure the
new Rules retain.2 12  The federal district courts, however, are
empowered to grant a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate despite the existence of another adequate
remedy; and they are further permitted to advance an action
for a declaratory judgment on the calendar, so as to obtain a
speedy hearing thereof.21' One of the most serious defects of
Louisiana practice is the complete absence of declaratory judg-
ment procedure.2 1 5
The motion for new trial in actions at law is amalgamated
with the equity petition for rehearing by Rule 59 (a) which pro-
vides:
"A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there
has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new
trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States; and (2) in an action tried without
a jury for any of the reasons for which rehearings have here-
tofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of the
United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and con-
clusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment."
211. Ibid.
212. Judicial Code, § 274 (d) as amended, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) as amended
by 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), 28 U.S.C.A. § 400 (1937).
213. Rule 57.
214. Ibid.
215. In 1930 a committee of the Louisiana State Bar Association drafted
a proposed Declaratory Judgments Act for Louisiana, which was amended to
some degree by the committee in 1931. 30 La. State Bar Ass'n Rep. (1930)
169-172; 31 La. State Bar Ass'n Rep. (1931) 146-147. This proposed act was
rejected by the membership in 1932 and the subject thus far has not been
revived. Of all the arguments directed against a Declaratory Judgments Act
only that of Mr. Sidney L. Herold of the Shreveport Bar merits consideration.
His argument may be summed up by the following words of his speech
against recommending adoption of the act: "I can see in a declaratory
judgment law abundant opportunity for the manufacture of jurisprudence by
moot cases." 32 La. State Bar Ass'n Rep. (1932) 62. Mr. Herold's real objec-
tion is to case precedent. He has assumed his major premise that the
Declaratory Judgments Act will permit moot cases to be submitted to the
courts.
[Vol. I
1938] FEDERAL RULES, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 75
The same reasons which permit a party to move for a new
trial enable the court to grant one on its own initiative.216 Thus
far the motion for new trial is substantially similar to the Louis-
iana rule for new trial27 and petition for rehearing.21 8 But all
motions for new trial, and new trials granted on the court's own
initiative, must be made within 10 days after entry of judg-
ment;219 except that when a party moves for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence the motion may be filed
after 10 days from date of entry of judgment as long as it is filed
prior to the expiration of the time for appeal.12 0 The parties may
present affidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for
new trial.2 2 1 No error in ruling on evidence, or error in any ruling
or order, is ground for a new trial or setting aside a verdict, or for
disturbing any judgment or order "unless refusal to take such ac-
tion appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 212 2
Similarly to Louisiana practice, the new Rules permit the
correction of clerical errors in judgments or orders at any time.223
Differently from Louisiana practice, however, the new Rules per-
mit the court to relieve "a party or his legal representative from
a judgment, order or proceeding taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."'2 2 Such a
motion must be made within a reasonable time, but in no case to
exceed six months from the time the judgment, order or proceed-
ing was taken.225
The power of trial and appellate courts to stay proceedings
to enforce judgments during the pendency of appeals will be dis-
cussed later. In addition to such power, the federal district courts
are given discretion to stay proceedings to enforce judgments
during the pendency of any motion for new trial, motion for relief
from a judgment or order, or motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto, on such conditions for the security of the adverse party
as the courts may deem proper.
2 2 6
216. Rule 59 (d).
217. Arts. 557-563, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
218. La. Act 10 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1932) H§ 1480-1482].
219. Rule 59 (b, d).
220. Rule 59 (b).
221. Rule 59 (a, c).
222. Rule 61.
223. Rule 60 (a). Cf. Glenn Falls Indemnity Co. v. Manning, 168 So. 787
(La. App. 1936) and cases cited therein.
224. Rule 60 (b).
225. Ibid.
226. Rule 62 (b).
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PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES-All provisional remedies,
for the seizure of person or property to secure satisfaction of
the judgment ultimately, which are provided by statutes of the
United States or state law at the time may be employed under
the new Rules, regardless of whether the action was lodged in the
federal court originally, or removed there."27 Consequently, the
Louisiana conservatory writs of arrest, attachment, provisional
seizure and sequestration are available to litigants in the federal
courts. It is important to remember, however, that under federal
procedure these provisional remedies are but incidents to the
suit, and unless personal service is had upon the defendant in
actions instituted originally in the federal courts, the latter will
not have jurisdiction. 228 Thus, such jurisdiction can not be ac-
quired merely through nonresident attachment proceedings. The
procedure for injunctive relief is prescribed specially by the new
Rules.2 9 It is substantially identical with Louisiana's present in-
junction procedure. 30
Money judgments are enforced by a "writ of execution" un-
less the court directs otherwise. This shall be carried out "in
accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which
the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is
sought, except that any statute of the United States governs to
the extent that it is applicable."'' 1  Examination of the judgment
debtor is permitted by the Rules."32 Judgments which direct the
execution of documents or the performance of acts, may be en-
forced either: (1) through the appointment of some person to
execute the document if the party cast refuses to do so; (2)
through punishment for contempt for refusal to comply with the
judgment; or (3) if the property is within the jurisdiction of the
court, through the rendition of another judgment divesting and
vesting title in accordance with the original judgment.23  These
methods for enforcing judgments other than those for the pay-
ment of a sum of money, appear to be superior to those obtaining
under Louisiana practice.2"
227. Rule 64.
228. Ex parte Des Moines & M. R. Co., 103 U. S. 794, 796, 26 LEd. 461, 462
(1880). Cf. Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U. S. 173, 29 S. Ct. 552, 53 L. Ed. 955 (1909).
229. Rule 65.
230. La. Act 29 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1932) H§ 2078-2083]. The Louisiana
Injunction Act was based upon the federal injunction procedure as it existed
In 1924. 26 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. (1925) 15, 20.
231. Rule 69 (a).
232. Ibid.
233. Rule 70.
234. Cf. Arts. 630-640, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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A most interesting procedural device adopted by the new
Federal Rules is the offer of judgment. "At any time more than 10
days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be taken against him... with costs then accrued. 2 5 If the offer is
accepted within 10 days of its service, either party may then file
the notices of offer and acceptance with the clerk who enters
judgment accordingly. If the offer is not accepted within 10 days
it is deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible.
If the adverse party does not obtain a judgment more favorable
than the offer he is not entitled to recover costs subsequent
thereto.236 This is quite similar to the rules of tender in Louisi-
ana, "7 but permit a party to escape costs and annoyance of con-
tinued litigation without actually paying the amount tendered.
APPEALS-Under the new Rules an appeal from a district court
to the Supreme Court is taken by a petition for appeal accom-
panied by an assignment of errors. "The appeal shall be allowed,
a citation issued, a jurisdictional statement filed, a bond on appeal
and supersedeas bond taken, and the record on appeal made and
certified as prescribed by law and the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States governing such an appeal.
28
An appeal from a federal district court to a circuit court of
appeals is prosecuted by filing in the district court a notice of
appeal.23 9 This notice "shall specify the parties taking the appeal;
shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from; and
shall name the court to which the appeal is taken. ' 240 Notification
of the appeal is mailed to the attorneys of or all interested parties
by the clerk; but his failure to do so does not affect the validity
of the appeal. This practice appears simpler than, but somewhat
similar to, the appeal through petition or motion in Louisiana.2 41
Similarly to our own practice,242 if the appeal is not intended to
suspend the operation of the judgment only a cost bond is neces-
sary.2 43 While the amounts of the bonds may vary somewhat,
235. Rule 68.
236. Ibid.
237. Arts. 404-417, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
238. Rule 72; Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
(1928), Rules 10 (1), 12 as amended, 36; 50 S.Ct. xxxi, xxxii, xxxviii (1929); 52
S. Ct. xxxi-xxxii (1931).
239. Rule 73 (a).
240. Rule 73 (b).
241. Art. 573, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act. 49
of 1871.
242. Art. 578, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
248. Rule 73 (c).
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under both systems a bond adequate to protect the appellee must
be furnished if the appeal is to suspend the enforcement of the
judgment.24'
The new Rules make an important change affecting appeals
by parties cast jointly in the same judgment. Under the former
practice, unless all such parties united in suing out the appeal,
summons and severance was necessary. 2," Rule 74 now permits
the appeal in such cases to be prosecuted by any of the parties
jointly cast, without the necessity of summons and severance.
Any one familiar with Edward Livingston's efforts toward
simplification of procedure in Louisiana will rise from a study
of the new Federal Rules with a feeling that his spirit has helped
to guide and direct the work of the Supreme Court Committee.
No stone has been left unturned in the effort to insure "the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. '24 6 The
application of these Rules in the federal district courts of Louisi-
ana is certain to demonstrate the need for procedural reform in
this state.
We do not imply that Louisiana's present system is so un-
workable that it should be discarded in order to accept another.
There are many points of excellence in our procedure which
other American jurisdictions have not yet attained. We do sub-
mit, however, that there is considerable room for improvement in
our present practice, and that much could be borrowed profitably
from the new Federal Rules. No large-scale program of improve-
ment of procedure has been attempted in Louisiana since 1824.247
For the most part we are employing a system designed for the
needs of more than a century ago. What little improvement has
been attempted has not been co-ordinated, and in many instances
the remedy has proven worse than the evil. If, during the past
hundred and fourteen years, Louisiana has been waiting for a
propitious moment to continue the work of Livingston, then that
moment is at hand.
Just as important, however, as the subjects of reform are the
methods of reform. Two modes of effecting procedural reform
244. Rule 73 (d); Art. 575, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended
by La. Act 289 of 1926; Arts. 576-577, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
245. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169, 52 S. Ct.
354, 76 L. Ed. 685 (1932) and cases cited therein.
246. Rule 1.
247. The revision of 1870 merely deleted all references to the institution
of slavery, and brought into the Code of Practice all statutes affecting proce-
dure adopted since 1825.
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are open to us. Either we may divide responsibility for the admin-
istration of civil justice by permitting a Legislature composed in
the main of laymen to select the tools with which the courts are
required to work, or we may place the entire responsibility defi-
nitely upon the courts by directing them to prescribe suitable
rules of procedure. The first method contemplates that any neces-
sary revision be effected by a large legislative body meeting in-
frequently and with little or no opportunity for adequate study.
The second places the responsibility of improvement in the branch
of government which has the best opportunity of discerning the
necessity thereof, and which can effect the needed revision at
any time. Louisiana practice today is the fruit of the first method.
The new Federal Rules are the product of the second. A compari-
son of the results obtained is sufficient to determine our mode of
procedural reform.
